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Abstract. Robustness testing aims at finding errors in a system un-
der invalid conditions, such as unexpected inputs. We propose a robust-
ness testing approach for Event-B based on specification mutation and
model-based testing. We assume that a specification describes the valid
inputs of a system. By applying negation rules, we mutate the precon-
dition of events to explore invalid behaviour. Tests are generated from
the mutated specification using ProB. ProB has been adapted to ef-
ficiently process mutated events. Mutated events are statically checked
for satisfiability and enability using constraint satisfaction, to prune the
transition search space. This has dramatically improve the performance
of test generation. The approach is applied to the Java Card bytecode
verifier. Large mutated specifications (containing 921 mutated events)
can be easily tackled to ensure a good coverage of the robustness test
space.
Keywords: Robustness Testing, Specification Mutation, Model-Based Testing,
Vulnerability Analysis, Intrusion Testing, Event-B, ProB
1 Introduction
Functional testing aims at finding errors in the functionality of a system, e.g.,
testing that the correct outputs are produced for correct inputs. In contrast, ro-
bustness testing aims at finding errors in a system under invalid conditions, such
as unexpected inputs. Various strategies can be used for system specification.
A specification may describe the behaviour for valid inputs only, for instance
by using preconditions and postconditions. In that case, an input that does not
satisfy the precondition is considered as invalid. A specification may describe
the behaviour for all possible inputs, detailing error messages to be produced in
case of invalid inputs. In that case, robustness testing coincide with functional
testing, because the specification covers both valid and invalid inputs.
Model-based testing (MBT) aims at generating tests from a specification.
When the analysis of a specification can be automated, MBT can automate
the production of tests and provide systematic coverage of the test space at a
reasonable cost. Formal specification languages are particularly suitable for au-





MBT can become an incentive for using formal specifications if the coverage
obtained is better than manually derived tests, at a comparable cost. However,
if the specification considers only valid inputs, then automated MBT cannot ex-
ercise a good coverage of invalid inputs, because the specification is not built for
that, and test generation techniques typically only cover valid input sequences.
In that particular case, model-based functional testing is unable to adequately
cover robustness testing.
In this paper, we propose a mutation-based approach to deal with model-
based robustness testing. Mutation testing has been typically applied to pro-
grams to evaluate the adequacy of tests. A good set of tests should identify
faults in mutated programs. We take a different view-point and use specifica-
tion mutation to identify invalid behaviour and then apply automated MBT on
mutated specifications to generate tests for robustness testing of an implementa-
tion. In particular, we focus on the mutation of preconditions, by providing a set
of rules for computing the negations of a precondition. The advantages are two-
fold. First, the behaviour for valid inputs can often be abstracted and simplified;
for robustness testing, there is no need to describe these cases in detail, because
they are not part of the test objective. A specification built for robustness testing
does not need to be detailed enough to prove the correctness of an implemen-
tation. This helps in reducing the cost of building a formal specification. For
instance, in this work we are targeting robustness testing of the Java Card byte-
code verifier (JCBCV) [12]. We do not need to build a complete specification of
the JCBCV in order to generate tests for invalid bytecode programs. We simply
need to focus on the conditions that characterize valid bytecode programs, and
by negation, we obtain the conditions of invalid bytecode programs. In other
words, a specification built for robustness testing can be much simpler than a
specification built to describe the full functional behaviour of a system. Second,
the mutation process allows us to provide fine grain invalid conditions in order
to ensure good coverage of invalid inputs. A model checker can then be used to
exercise these fine grain negated conditions and select tests for very specific con-
ditions. We use ProB [10] for that purpose. For instance, the condition A = B,
where A and B are sets, can be negated in various ways: A is empty and B is
not, A is strictly included in B, A and B are disjoint, A and B are not disjoint,
etc. A MBT technique will provide test criteria in order to decide which cases
should be covered. In our approach, we use negation rules to build mutants that
identify these cases, so that we can reuse a model checker on the mutants to
exercise the desired test cases. This provides a greater level of automation and
simplifies the construction of model-based test generation tools. Moreover, we
ensure that the test cases are disjoint and that mutants always generate invalid
traces, thus no unnecessary tests are generated. This is especially important for
embedded systems like Java Cards.
Our approach is particularly interesting for penetration testing, which is a
special kind of robustness testing; it aims at finding security faults. For instance,
a JCBCV checks that a Java Card application satisfies the security constraints





prescribes a precondition and a postcondition for each bytecode instruction.
Robustness testing aims at checking that a JCBCV will reject invalid bytecode
programs. If a JCBCV accepts an invalid bytecode program, then a vulnerability
has been identified in the JCBCV. Such vulnerabilities may be exploited to define
attacks on Java-based smart cards.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview
of our robustness test generation approach. Section 3 describes the Event-B
model of the JCBCV used for our case study. Section 4 describes our approach
for mutating Event-B specifications and negating predicates of the Event-B
language. Section 5 describes the improvements made to ProB in order to effi-
ciently carry out model-based test generation. Section 6 describes the applica-
tion of our approach to the case study and compares the results with a previous
version of this work presented in [15]. Section 7 compares our approach with
similar work in MBT and mutation testing. Section 8 concludes this paper with
an appraisal of our work and an outlook on future work.
2 Overview of the Approach
2.1 The Event-B Method
Event-B [1] is a state-based, event-driven modelling notation. Event-B mod-
els are developed through stepwise refinement. An Event-B model is composed
of two parts, a static part composed of contexts and a dynamic part composed
of machines. A context defines constants and constraints on its constants called
axioms. A machine has state variables, invariants, which describe properties of
state variables, and events. An event is composed of a guard and an action. An
event can be triggered when its guard is satisfied; the execution of the event’s
action can modify the machine state. One must prove that each event execu-
tion preserves the machine invariants. Event-B refinement allows for behaviour
refinement (i.e., reducing non-determinism, guard strengthening, event split-
ting/merging, and introduction of new events) and for data refinement (i.e.,
adding new state variables and replacing state variables).
2.2 Overview of Robustness Test Generation
Figure 1 provides an overview of the robustness test generation process. It takes
as input an Event-B project which contains a set of refinements and a set of
contexts. In this paper, we focus on the mutation of machines. We assume that
this input model describes the valid traces of the system. Our approach generates
invalid traces of this model by mutating its events. An Event-B model that
refines another model inherits all events of the model it refines. In order to have
all events in a single model, the first step is to merge these refinements into
a single model that contains all events. This flattened model is then analyzed
by the model mutator to generate mutants for each event. A mutant event is





to the guard of an event. A negation rule can produce several mutants, thus an
event can be mutated into several mutants. The mutant events are added to the
original model, so that the final mutant model contains both the original events
and their mutants. The mutant model is then analyzed with the constraint-
based checker of ProB to generate traces of the mutant model. Coverage in
MBT is typically decomposed into data coverage criteria and structural coverage
criteria. Our data coverage criteria are determined by the negation rules. Each
mutant event identifies an invalid case to cover. Structural coverage is ensured
by our breadth-first search algorithm in ProB. A test consists of a trace of
the form [e1, . . . , en, en+1], where ei with i ∈ 1..n is a valid event, and en+1 is
a mutant event which denotes an invalid event. A mutant event is contained
in at most one trace (unreachable mutants appear in no trace), in order to
minimize the number of tests generated. No false negatives are generated, that
is, each generated trace should be rejected by the system under test (SUT).
Each test considers a specific test case for a given event. For robustness testing
of most systems, there is no need to include more than one invalid event in a test,
because the first invalid event should be detected by the SUT and rejected. If it
is not possible to observe that an invalid input was rejected immediately after
it was submitted, then additional events may be added after the invalid event.
However, this requires a specification that covers both valid and invalid cases,
which is more time consuming to build, but it does provide a better coverage
than our approach, which aims at automating robustness testing with the least
specification effort. Our algorithm uses a breadth-first search to generate traces


























Fig. 1. Overview of the Robustness Test Generation Process
3 Formal Model of the bytecode Verifier
The JCBCV is a complex system and we model it using stepwise refinement to
deal with complexity. We do not model the bytecode verifier itself, but the byte-
code instructions. A trace of our model represents the byte array of a method.





parameters whose types are set to byte, short and reference. We use some pre-
determined classes, called TestClassA, TestClassB and TestClassC , which are
modelled in an Event-B context.
3.1 Java Card Instruction sets
We partition Java Card instructions, called JCInstructions, into four sets.
1. Return : instructions that exit a method,
2. Branching : branching instructions,
3. FieldAccess : instructions for reading or writing object fields,
4. Linear = JCInstructions \ Return \ Branching : instructions that do no
branch or return.
Our model covers JCInstructions \ Branching \ FieldAccess, for a total of 62
bytecode instructions, using 66 events. Branching instructions (41) require a
more complex control structure that we plan to add in the near future. Field
access instructions (32) are not difficult to model; we simply need to add a model
of objects to take these instructions into account.
3.2 The Refinements
Our model is decomposed into seven layers of refinement. Each model introduces
a new concept and defines abstract instructions which are successively refined.
Concrete instructions corresponding to bytecode instructions are introduced only
in the final level. The first level represents the return concept. It introduces two
abstract instructions, one that denotes linear instructions and one that denotes
returning instructions. A state variable programRunning is initialized to true and
set to false by a return instruction. A guard prevents instructions to be executed
after a return. The second refinement introduces variable stackSize, whose value
is bounded by constantMaxStackSize, and defines an abstract instruction for each
type of stack size update. The third refinement introduces guards to check that
enough elements or enough space is available in the stack. The fourth refinement
introduces the stack itself, whose elements are java types, not java values. The
inheritance tree on types is also introduced. The fifth refinement deals with local
variables, which represent either method parameters or method local variables.
The sixth refinement deals with object initialization and the constant pool. The
seventh refinement introduces the concrete instructions.
3.3 The State Model
The Java Card Inheritance Tree Java Card types can be represented by a
semilattice, with an artificial Top element and type compatibility can be checked
using this semilattice. Two types are compatible if their least upper bound is
not Top. Figure 2 represents the semilattice. The interfaces and arrays of refer-














































Fig. 2. Java Card semilattice
for type inference. The lighter elements represent concrete Java types. Type
unknownType is used to represent memory access violations like stack overflow.
Type unInitLocalVar denotes values of uninitialized local variables.
The stack in a specification of valid inputs only would be modeled as partial
function stack ∈ 0 ..MaxStackSize−1 7→TYPES . Such a model is inadequate to
represent stack overflows or stack underflows, since a model checker like ProB
will not find elements outside a valid stack. The mutation of the invariant could
potentially solve such problems, but it is hard to derive a general rule that would
properly manage all types of Event-B variable. Instead, we decided to manually
change this type to an appropriate value that models invalid cases, that is, stack
domain si extended to −4 ..MaxStackSize − 1. We have determined by analysis
of the bytecode language that at least 4 negative index positions are needed to
generate stack underflow attacks (e.g., instruction swap).
Object initialization involves four instructions. Since we use a bread-first
search to generate traces, tests that require an initialized object are longer to
generate. To simplify this, we use a single event to represent these four instruc-
tions of initialization.
4 Event-B Specification Mutation
4.1 Mutation of an Event-B Machine
An Event-B machine contains several parts. The mutation process only alters





existing events. Let M.E, M.V , M.I respectively denote the set of events, the
set of variables and the set of invariants of machine M .
M.V := M.V ∪ {eutExecuted}
M.I := M.I ∪ {eutExecuted ∈ BOOL}




Variable eutExecuted is added to control the generation of tests. It ensures that
an invalid event has been added to the trace. It is initialised to FALSE in the
initialisation event of M .
4.2 Mutation of an Event
An event of an Event-B machine has the following general form.
Event e =̂ any . . . , vi , . . .
where . . . , grdj : fj , . . .
then . . . , actk : wk := tk , . . .
end
The “any” part introduces local variables vi of the event, which represent event
parameters. The “where” part introduces the guard of the event, which consists
of a list of labeled formula grdi : fi, where grdi is the label of formula fi. The
formula of the list are implicitly conjoined to make the event’s guard. Guards
are also used to type the local variables.
A mutation of an event is computed as follows. Only a subset of the guard’s
formula are negated; these formula are manually tagged by the specifier by
adding suffix “_t” at the end of their label. The tagged formula are conjoined
into a single formula ft, and untagged formula are also conjoined to form a sec-
ond formula fu. The choice of the formula to negate depends on the problem at
hand and the test objectives. A mutant event computed by mutate(e) has the
following form, where f ′t is a negation of ft. We define in the next section how
f ′t is computed.
Event e =̂ any . . . , vi , . . .
where grdt : f ′t ,
grdu : fu
grdeut : eutExecuted = FALSE
then acteut : eutExecuted := TRUE
end
The guard of a mutant event is composed of the untagged formulas left un-
changed and a negation of the tagged formulas. The actions of the original event
are replaced with SKIP , which leaves the state unchanged. This choice is as good
as any other state modification, since we assume that the specification only deals
with valid inputs. Moreover, we do not extend a trace ending with an invalid





4.3 Negation of a Formula
We say that f ′ is a negation of a formula f iff it satisfies one of the following
two constraints.
f ′ ⇒ ¬f (1) f ′ ⇒ ¬WD(f) (2)
Constraint (1) says that when f ′ holds, ¬f holds. Thus, a negation f ′ is not
equivalent to ¬f ; it can be stricker. Constraint (2) caters for partial operators
of the Event-B language. Event-B uses a two-value logic. To ensure that
each formula has a meaning, Event-B contains proof obligations that must be
discharged for each formula that uses a partial operator. For instance, to make
sure that x = y ÷ z is well-defined, one must prove that z 6= 0. Thus, such a
predicate involving a partial operator is typically used within a formula of the
form z 6= 0 ⇒ x = y ÷ z, so that the well-definedness proof can be discharged.
Predicate WD(f) holds when formula f is well-defined, that is, all operators
used in f are called within their domain of definition. By negating it, we ensure
that we test partial operators for undefinedness.
A negation f ′ denotes a robustness test case of f . By controlling the form
of f ′, we determine the data coverage criteria of our MBT approach. The nega-
tions of a formula f for constraint (1) are computed using a set of rewrite rules
of the form neg(f) {f ′1, . . . , f ′n}, where neg(f) is an inductively defined oper-
ator. A single rule is defined for each connective and predicate of the Event-B
language. To ensure coherence and completeness of the negation process, one
should prove for each rule that the set of negations is equivalent to ¬f (i.e.,
¬f ⇔ f ′1 ∨ . . . ∨ f ′n). To ensure that test cases are disjoint and to minimize
the set of tests generated, one should also prove for each rule that negations
are mutually disjoint (i.e.,
∧
i6=j ¬(f ′i ∧ f ′j)). We have defined negation rules for
each predicate and logical connective of the Event-B language. We provide be-
low a few illustrative examples. For the sake of concision, we use the following
convention: all connectives are lifted point-wise to sets, such that, for instance,
f ∧ neg(g), with neg(g) = {g1, . . . , gn}, denotes {f ∧ g1, . . . , f ∧ gn}.
neg(p1 ∧ p2) (neg(p1) ∧ p2) ∪ (p1 ∧ neg(p2)) ∪ (neg(p1) ∧ neg(p2))
neg(p1 ∨ p2) neg(p1) ∧ neg(p2)
neg(∀x · p) ∃x · neg(p)
neg(i1 < i2) {i1 = i2} ∪ {i1 > i2}
neg(i1 ≤ i2) {i1 > i2}
neg(e ∈ E) {e 6∈ E}
neg(E1 ⊂ E2) {E1 6= ∅ ∧ E2 = ∅} ∪ {E1 = ∅ ∧ E2 = ∅} ∪
{E1 6= ∅ ∧ E1 = E2} ∪ {E2 6= ∅ ∧ E2 ⊂ E1} ∪
{E1 ∩ E2 6= ∅ ∧ E1 6⊆ E2 ∧ E2 6⊆ E1} ∪
{E1 6= ∅ ∧ E2 6= ∅ ∧ E1 ∩ E2 = ∅}
The negation rule for conjunction generates all possible subsets of negated con-





ering disjointness and emptiness of operands. This last rule illustrates the im-
portance of proving coherence, completeness and disjointness. Model finders like
ProB and Alloy are quite useful to debug negation rules on discrete structures
like sets, relations and functions.
The negation rules for well-definedness are of two kinds. The rules for connec-
tives, predicates and total operators simply propagate well-definedness negation
to their operands, e.g.,
negWD(p1 ∧ p2) negWD(p1) ∪ negWD(p2)
The following rules cater for the partial operators of Event-B.
negWD(i1 ÷ i2) negWD(i1) ∪ negWD(i2) ∪ {i2 = 0}
negWD(f(x)) negWD(f) ∪ negWD(x) ∪ {x 6∈ dom(f)}
negWD(min(E),max (E), inter(E)) negWD(E) ∪ {E = ∅}
The rules for terms which are either constants or variables terminate the re-
cursion defining negWD with negWD(symbol)  ∅. Rules for well-definedness
negation are complementary to rules for negation. For instance,
neg(z 6= 0⇒ x = y ÷ z) = {z 6= 0 ∧ x 6= y ÷ z}
whereas
negWD(z 6= 0⇒ x = y ÷ z) = {z = 0}
5 Model-Based Testing Algorithm Improvements and
Performance
In MBT one wants to generate traces and values which satisfy a certain cover-
age criterion. There are two ways this coverage can be achieved systematically:
using model checking or using a constraint-based approach. In this paper we
have used the constraint-based approach: it can deal much better with con-
stants which have many possible values and with events whose parameters have
many possible values (like the Java Card instructions). Driven by this case study,
the performance of the constraint-based test generation has been considerably
improved, and the algorithm has been made more intelligent by using statically
computed enabling and feasibility information. This can both considerably speed
up the test generation algorithm and provide better user feedback. Indeed, often
the algorithm can terminate earlier, as the algorithm is not trying to cover in-
feasible events, and then provide the user with informative feedback that certain
events can definitely never be covered.
5.1 Feasibility Analysis
In this case study one has a very large number of events: events corresponding
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Fig. 3. Sample Run of the MBT Algorithm
expected that many mutants cannot ever be covered, and a first improvement
lies in detecting as many of the uncoverable events before starting the MBT
algorithm proper. This is done by the feasibility analysis, which calls the ProB
constraint solver to check for every event with guard G whether it can find a
solution for the axioms, invariant and G. If no such solution exists, then the
event is marked as infeasible and ignored in the main MBT algorithm below.
If a solution was found, the invariant of the machine admits a state where the
guard G of the event is true; whether such a state can actually be reached is
precisely the task of the main MBT algorithm. If a time-out occurs, then the
event is considered potentially feasible and not ignored in main MBT algorithm.
5.2 Enabling Analysis
Our enabling analysis for MBT computes two types of information for every
event e:
– enable(e) : the set of events f that can go from disabled to enabled after
executing e in states that satisfy the invariant. The ProB constraint solver
solves the constraint ¬Grdf ∧ Inv ∧BAe ∧Grd′f , where BAe is the before-
after predicate of e and Grdf , Grd′f are respectively the guard of f applied
to the before state and the after state. In case of a time-out it is assumed
that f is in enable(e). We extend the function enable for paths p to be either
Events if p = [] and equal to enable(last(p)) otherwise.
– feasibleAfter(e): the set of events f that can be enabled after executing e.
The constraint solver solves the constraint Inv ∧ BAe ∧ Grd′f . In case of a
time-out it is assumed that f is in feasibleAfter(e). We again extend the
function feasibleAfter for paths p to be either Events if p = [] and equal
to feasibleAfter(last(p)) otherwise.
In the absence of time-outs, we have that enable(e) ⊆ feasibleAfter(e).
5.3 Main MBT Algorithm
The constraint-based test generation algorithm implemented within ProB is a
breadth-first algorithm, which maintains a list of paths (aka sequences of events)





initialisation and parameters of all involved events. Figure 3 shows a sample of
such paths; the paths ending with a newly covered event (shown in blue) are
tests; the other paths have not yet been useful in covering new events, but may
be extended into paths which cover new target events.
To not distract from the essentials, we present a simplified version of the
algorithm in Fig. 4. The full algorithm, can also deal with target predicates in
addition to target events.
The breadth-first algorithm gives priority to generating new test cases: for a
given depth, it will first try to cover new target events (by appending a target
event t to existing paths p of length depth). For example, when reaching depth
3 in Figure 3, we would first try [e1, e2, e3, e4] (provided e4 ∈ enable(e3)) and
then [e1, e2, e2, e4] (provided e4 ∈ enable(e2)). Only after all candidates p ← t
of a given length have been processed, will it generate paths which end with an
event e that has already been covered. In Figure 3 this would be [e1, e2, e3, e1]
(provided e1 ∈ feasibleAfter(e3)) and [e1, e2, e3, e2] and so on. Note that the
use of the auxiliary variable target′ in line 16 of Fig. 4 is to avoid checking an
event e a second time (in case we generated a new test case for it in line 9).
For efficiency, the user can also specify certain events to be final; the algorithm
will never try to extend a path ending with a final event. For example, if e3
were declared final we would not attempt any path extending [e1, e2, e3]. In our
case study, the target events are the mutants, and all mutants events are also
declared final.
6 Experimentation and Comparison
In [15], an earlier version of this robustness testing approach is described. This
paper improves on [15] in the following ways. First, it speeds up the mutation
process. In [15], mutants were generated using the Rodin platform. One mutant
model was generated for each mutant of an event, since ProB could not be
efficiently used on a large model containing all mutants. This could not scale
up as we tried to cover more bytecode instructions in our tests. The model
used in [15] covered 12 instructions of the Java Card bytecode language. We are
now taking into account 62 bytecode instructions using 66 events. It takes 24
hours using Rodin to build the environment for all 921 mutant models generated
from these 66 events. Rodin being based on Eclipse, it generates an internal
representation of each Event-B model, which is very time consuming for large
models. In the new approach, we directly use ProB to produce a single mutant
model containing all mutant events. The 921 mutant events are now generated
in 10 minutes. Negation rules can produce mutants who are unreachable, either
because their guard is unsatisfiable or because it can never be reached from the
initial state. These unreachable mutants were dramatically slowing down the
MBT process of ProB. We have estimated that the approach presented in [15]
would take 2 years to analyze the 921 mutant models. With the new approach,
a model containing all mutant events can be analyzed for MBT in 45 mins. It





1. Input: set of events target ⊆ Events and a set of events final ⊆ Events
2. Initially we set paths := {[ ]} where [ ] is the path of length 0
3. depth := 0
4. final is the set of events which have to be final; in our case study: target
5. target′ := target
6. for every p ∈ paths of length depth do:
7. for every t ∈ target ∩ enable(p) do:
8. if solve constraints of path p← t then
9. target := target \ {t}, store solution as test for t




14. if target = ∅ or maximum depth reached then return fi
15. for every p ∈ paths of length depth do:
16. for every e ∈ feasibleAfter(p) \ target′ \ final do:
17. if solve constraints of path p← e then path := path ∪ {p← e} fi
18. od
19. od
20. depth := depth+ 1; goto 5
Fig. 4. MBT Algorithm using Enabling Analysis
We are also proposing a new Event-B model that takes into account more
features of the Java Card bytecode language. We use a semilattice of types to
cater for type hierarchy. We also take into account operand stack underflows
and access to local variables outside a method’s frame. This leads us to identify
guidelines for modelling in Event-B in the context of robustness testing. Typing
of Event-B variables must be adapted to cater for invalid access. Finally, we
have added new negation rules in order to get 100 % coverage with respect
to a manually derived set of tests for the JCBCV and to cater for quantifiers
in first-order logic. In particular, we take into account the well-definedness of
expressions with partial operators (e.g., function application outside its domain,
like a division by zero).
The following example shows the modelling of instruction aload_3 that
pushes the local variable (localVariables) at index 3 (prm_index = 3) on the
stack. Event parameter push_1 is used as an alias to represent the element,
which is a Java type, to push. The guards to mutate (2, 5 and 8) are tagged with
_t. The other guards do not need to be mutated, since they represent execution
control information rather than the functional behaviour of the instruction.










grd2_t : stackSize < MaxStackSize
grd3 : push_1 ∈ TYPES
grd4 : prm_index ∈ dom(localVariables)
grd5_t : prm_index ≤ MaxLocalVariablesIndex
grd6 : push_1 = localVariables(prm_index )
grd7 : prm_index = 3
grd8_t : referenceTypes 7→ push_1 ∈ Lattice
then
act1 : stackSize := stackSize + 1
act2 : stack := stack ∪ {stackSize 7→ push_1}
end
We illustrate below two mutations (amongst 11) of instruction aload_3. We





grd2_t : stackSize = MaxStackSize
grd_eut : eutExecuted = FALSE
then






grd2_t : stackSize = MaxStackSize
grd8_t : referenceTypes 7→ push_1 /∈ Lattice
grd_eut : eutExecuted = FALSE
then
act_eut : eutExecuted := TRUE
end
These two mutants generate the following two tests.
1. [INIT, aconst_null, astore(3), aconst_null, aload_3_EUT_47, return]
2. [INIT, aload_3_EUT_53, return]
The first trace does a stack overflow with MaxStackSize = 1. The second one
pushes an uninitialized local variable on the stack and does a stack overflow with
MaxStackSize = 0, which exercises two faults.
The 223 generated tests were executed on the JCBCV provided by Oracle
in the Java Card SDK [13]. It failed on three tests, which are all related to
implicit type conversion on local variables. In the Java Card specification, a
distinction is made between byte and short, but Oracle’s implementation of





not cause potential security vulnerability. In [15] a subset of these tests for only
twelve instructions were executed on five Java Cards and most of the tests failed;
one fault was exploitable. Oracle’s JCBCV is typically not used on Java Cards,
because it is too big to be embedded in a smart card. It is used for offline
verification before loading bytecode programs on a card.
7 Related Work
MBT has been extensively studied (e.g., [3,4,11,16,17]) for extended state ma-
chines and automata. These notations use a more basic type system, compared
to (so called) model-based notation like Z, B, ASM, and Alloy, and thus use
different test criteria than ours. MBT has been applied to model-based notation
on a lesser extent, and mostly for functional testing [18]. Our work seems to
be the first to address robustness testing using mutation by negation. As al-
ready discussed in the introduction, functional MBT cannot cater for robustness
testing, unless invalid cases are modelled in detail, which requires significantly
more resources to build formal specifications. In [14], ProB is used to generate
functional tests using B specifications; no data coverage criteria are used; struc-
tural coverage is less specific than the one used in this paper. In [6], mutations
targeting typical syntactical errors are applied to ASM specifications, in order
to derive robustness tests. However, syntactical errors may generate both valid
and invalid tests, when the mutation does not affect the valid behaviour. In [8],
Alloy is used for applying classical functional MBT techniques and test criteria
for Java programs. Functional MBT has also been applied to Circus for data-flow
coverage [5] using specification traces.
Mutation testing has been extensively studied for programs (e.g., [2,7,9]), in
order to evaluate the quality of test suites. Mutation rules are designed for basic
programming data structures. Mutation testing for extended timed-automata is
used in [3] to detect faults in a car alarm. Mutation rules are guided by typical
modelling errors on automata transitions and guards, including simple negation.
8 Conclusion
Robustness testing aims at finding errors in a system under invalid conditions,
such as unexpected inputs. We have proposed a robustness testing approach
for Event-B based on specification mutation using guard negation and model-
based testing using ProB. Data coverage criteria are described by the negation
rules and structural coverage criteria are driven by the constraint-based checking
of ProB, which was optimized to rapidly exclude unfeasible mutants. These
enhancements allow our approach to scale up to large Event-B specifications
containing hundreds of events. The approach has been applied to type checking
of Java Card programs for a subset of 61 bytecode instructions generating more
than 900 mutants.
We plan to extend our Event-B model of the Java Card language to deal





on the negation of Event-B contexts, which will allow us to generate, using
ProB, complex class file structures to test structural verifications. Scaling up is
also an issue in this problem, since the Java Card specification contains a large
number of constraints on class files with complex interrelated data structures.
One lesson learned in this case study is that modelling for robustness testing
is different than modelling for proving the correctness of an implementation. On
the one hand, some invariants must be relaxed in order to cover invalid cases
and guards must be manually tagged to identify what should be negated. On the
other hand, a robustness specification can be simpler to build than a complete
functional specification for implementation correctness proof.
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